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BRETON NATIONALISM AND MODERN FRANCE:
THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION
David H. Fortier
University of Massachusetts

INTRODUCTION
In the Paris street riots of May, 1968, Breton students fought
under the flag of Brittany; the same year at the annual folk festival
held in Quimper members of a Breton folk-dance group, workers from
Brest, circulated petitions to the central government calling for a
restoration of ancient Breton liberties, including the use of the language in schools.

These were not isolated incidents but part of a

vigorous nationalist movement that has existed since the nineteenth
century, and which in its extreme phase demands full independence from
France and statehood for a population of over three million.
This paper is concerned with the dynamics of modern Breton nationalism; its origin and development from the formal inauguration of the
movement in the late nineteenth century to the present day.
solely with documentary sources

l

Working

and following the approach of Thrupp

(1970) and Wolf (1969) I have utilized the case history method to
cover the background and circumstances out of which the movement grew,
the nature of its ideology and leadership, and its developmental career.
Three stages will be followed.

The first step will be to investigate

the impact of techno-economic change on the genesis of nationalism.
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The second step vill be to examine characteristic forms of nationalist
ideology, leadership and organization.

The third step will be to trace

the development of specific organizations in relationship to other
forms o f institutional change.

TECHNO-ECONOMIC CHANGE ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL
The Ecosystem Prior to Change
As a geographic region Brittany"s dominant characteristic is its
physical isolation from the rest of France.

This factor explains in

part both the failure of national integration and the resulting persistence and maintenance of strong regional cultural traditions until
the turn of the present century.

Looking like a great thumb projecting

into the Atlantic Ocean from the fist of France, Brittany's seaward
orientation was a characteristic feature from the time of early settlement.

Only a short sailing distance from Britain, it became the refuge

of Brythonic Ce lts fleeing from the Anglo-Saxon invasions of the sixth
century A.D.

Successive immigrating Celtic populations settled them-

selves along a ragge d coastline indented with natural harbors, developing an economy based on fishing and agriculture.

The interior, an

undulating plateau of forest and moorland, here and there broken by
rocky headlands and cut by swift rivers, remained remote and inaccessible.

For centuries cultivation remained fixed within a zone seldom

more than six kilometers from the coastline.
Until the late nineteenth century, when the Second Agricultural
Revolution brought profound changes in technology, the Breton peasant
economy was stabili zed on the basis of small-scale grain farming,
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primitive tools and hand labor, an ecotype Wolf refers to as paleotechnic
(1966:19).

Soil deficiencies and the scarcity of arable land acted as

further checks on agricultural producti vi ty and such surpluses as could
be produced were sufficient only to maintain a small-scale feudal order
in which the landowner-nobility were scarcely better off than the tenantpeasant.

Under such conditions a system of share-tenancy (metayage),

became the dominant form of tenure.

The latter half of the nineteenth

century found Brittany a rural backwater, remote in space and time from
the economic changes that had begun fifty years earlier to transform the
rest of France.

There were few other regions in the nation that had re-

tained so much the earmarks of the ancien . regime.
Peasant communities were small and isolated from each other.

Socio-

economic relationships were still based on a de facto feudal order;
share-tenancy and cash-tenancy were the dominant forms of peasant tenure.
Population growth had been slow but had long since outstripped available
land, and the peasant custom of partible inheritance had brought about
excessive fragmentation of land holdings.
one escape-valve: emigration.
sharply in the la.s t half of the

Pressure on the land had only

The drift to towns and cities increased
ninete~nth

century: where 8,000 Bretons

had left the region in the period 1831-1851, 116,000 departed between
1851-1872 (Delumeau 1969:466).

Emigration thus balancing population in-

crease, a low tolerable man-land ration was maintained.

While barely

provided with a living, the peasant was nevertheless subject to few of the
pri vations suffered by his brethren in

oth~r .: parts

of Europe at that time.
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The last two decades of the

ninet~enth

century saw the beginning

of a radical transformation in the Breton economy and regional culture
brought about primarily as a result of the Second Agricultural Revolution.

The results of these changes were to have a precipitating effect

on the rise of nationalistic organizations and the shaping of a nationalistic ideology.
The Causes of Change
The Second Agricultural Revolution emerging along with the Industrial Revolution drew from a common pool of scientific experimentation
and knowledge.

Major innovations in the field of agriculture included

techniques of crop rotation, the use of chemical fertilizers, new crop
types, and improved farm machinery.

Although these innovations had been

slowly transforming agriculture in other regions of France as far back
as the late eighteenth century, they were slow to reach Brittany.

The

factors of physical isolation and cultural conservatism certainly operated as major barriers; it was not until about 1880 that the transformation began, primarily through the medium of newly established farmers'
syndicates.
The agrarian syndicalist movement which did so much to break down
peasant conservatism was sponsored not by peasants but by innovators
from the landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie.

Inspired by the Social

Catholic ideology of the times, explicit in such writings as those of
the sociologist Frederic Le Play, the sponsors of agrarian reform saw
in the formation of syndicates a method of reaching the ears and mind
of the peasant, and a means of effecting socio-economic change in rural
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society. Encouraged by a bill passed by Parliament in 1884 legalizing
such groups, large landowners in Brittany began setting up local syndicates, later to be uni ted in a powerful regional structure ~ and federated
in 1886 as the Union Centrale des Syndicats des Agriculteurs de France
(UCSAF).

Although agricultural syndicates were open to all strata of

rural society, from large landlords to share-tenants and farm laborers,
leadership and control remained in the hands of a paternalistic landed
. t ocracy. 2
arlS

The agrarian syndicalist movement was given further impetus by
counter-moves to establish rival organizations.

Republican leaders,

again, not peasants but town dwellers with a sense of mission, set up
their own versions of syndi cates.

Called cooperatives (or mutuelles),

the emphasis was economic rather than social or moral, and among other
things provided farm credit and insurance.
A radical phase of the syndicalist movement emerged in the last
years of the nineteenth century.

Dissatisfied with the conservative

doctrines of the Social Catholics, militant priests organized a
splinter group known as the Christian Democrats.

In Brittany, the new

faction was led by Felix Trochur, a young Breton priest who preached
activism and emancipation, and was instrumental in establishing a network of syndicates along with insurance and credit societies.
Despite the divergences in m.oti vation and viewpoint, the factions
within the agrarian syndicalist movement were united in a common goal:
to increase the productivity of the peasant and, by marketing surplus
commodities, to make small-seale farming a profitable enterprise.

In
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the last two decades of the nineteenth century the desired changes were
effected in most of rural Brittany.

The use of new · equipment, new cul-

tivation methods, and chemical fertilizers made possible both an
extension and intensification of cultivation.

An innovation in plow

design spurred a trend toward massive land clearing, opening up the interior

moorland~

once used only for sheep pasturage.

The introduction

of new forage crops now permitted the raising of horses, cows and pigs.
Rye, the traditional grain staple, was replaced by wheat and new types
of vegetables that found a ready local market.
Although mixed farming tended to remain the basis of Breton agriculture, a shift to market gardening occurred in areas along the coast
where milder microclimates favored early vegetables.

The building of

a railway line in 1880 linking coastal Brittany to Paris further
accelerated the trend toward cash-cropping and in a number of areas
canneries were established to handle surplus commodities.

By the turn

of the century agriculture had been transformed into an economic enterprise that aimed at maximum production and maximal profits in a competitive market system on both a regional and national level.

Whether

the peasant sold milk and butter or surplus wheat locally, or produced
peas and artichokes for sale in Paris, his involvement in the world of
the marketplace entailed a major shift to a new way of life in which
the self-subsistent quasi-feudal isolation of the past was replaced by
an emergent awareness of his integration within a regional and national
politico-economic system.
The railway line that opened up Brittany to national and world
markets spurred the development of another sector of the regional
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economy, the fishing industry.

Prior to the construction of the railway

line in 1880 fishing was scaled to the needs of the local market.
the

develop~ent

With

of fast transportation fish hauls could be shipped to

meet the demands of the Paris market.

Fishing rapidly became commercial-

ized; fleets increased in size becoming highly specialized, particularly
in deep-sea fishing for cod and tuna, and off-shore fishing for sardines.
In turn the development of ship-building and the construction of local
canneries changed fishing villages into small-scale commercial ports.
The Ramifications of Techno-Economic Change
Thus at the turn of the century major

techno~economic

changes in

rural and maritime Brittany had brought to an isolated, self-sufficient,
but poverty-ridden

population the bright promise of

with its attendant benefits.

'~modernization"

But the results of these changes within

the next two decades of the twentieth century were largely negative.
Demographic expansion checked the gains from increased agricultural
productivity, and entry into a competitive world market rendered the
Breton fishing economy highly vulnerable to price fluctuations.

The

eventual decline in the economy coupled with a growing realization of
Brittany's peripheral position with regard to the center of economic and
political control in Paris, created a favorable breeding-ground for incipient nationalism.

Let us examine these factors in some detail.

Increased productivity, one of the prime effects of neo-technic
agriculture, served not only to tie the peasant to the local market, but
substantially enlarged his food supply and improved his diet.

The result

was an expansion in family size creating a significant surge in population
growth out of proportion to available arable land.

The drift from rural
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areas to local towns and

citi~s

wag acc818rated, but because urban

areas were limited in size and number with small-scale industries
that could only absorb limited labor, the result was simply to increase the number of unemployed.

The alternative was massive

migration from the region: between 1891-1911 the exodus increased
to 206,000 compared with 126,000 from 1872-1891 (Delumeau 1969:466).
The inability of the Breton economy to keep pace with population
was becoming increasingly evident.
The decline of the highly specialized fishing industry further
added to a sense of crisis.

In the fast expanding competitive mar-

ket of commercial fishing, Brittany soon fell behind.
sardine industry was first struck.

The important

An oversupply in conjunction

with heavy competition from foreign trawler fleets brought a collapse
in prices.

Conflict was generated internally: fishermen disputed

with canneries over prices, factory workers were at odds with bosses,
and fisherman undercut fisherman (Delumeau 1969:473-5).

About the

same time deep-sea fishing was declining for the same reasons.

Com-

petition from foreign mechanized fleets and the invasion of European
markets by cheaper products each year reduced the number of ships
leaving Breton ports.

By the beginning of World War I fleets had

dwindled, ports were at a standstill, and unemployment was widespread.
The War itself effectively brought to an end what had been for over
three decades Brittany's major economic enterprise.
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THE EMERGENCE OF BRETON NATIONALISM
Incipient Nationalism at the Turn of the Century
Against this background of increasing economic and social dislocation in the pre-World War I period, there crystallized a growing sense
of estrangement from the centralized bureaucracy in Paris whose inaction
in the face of the crisis was interpreted as disinterest in Brittany's
special problems.

The movement of protest against economic competitors

took on a nationalist coloring with the establishment of the Union
Regionaliste Bretonne (URB) in 1898.

Moderate in its ideology, the URB

phrased its economic demands in terms of a regional nationalism that had
been latent ever since the French Revolution had revoked Brittany's
political autonomy.
Through the nineteenth century a small but dedicated intellectual
elitist group had kept alive a consciousness of a distinctive Breton
heritage and history: the Celtic language and cultural ties; the centuries
of independence which ended in 1532 when, as a result of a royal marriage
the Duchy of Brittany became a part of France; the concession of regional
autonomy, with a separate and sovereign assembly until 1789 when these
rights were annulled by the Jacobins; the suppression of Breton language
and culture; the revolt of General Cadoudal who led the Breton armies
against Napoleon in 1804 and was subsequently defeated and beheaded.
Elitist groups, predominantly drawn from the monarchist upper class,
attempted to maintain a concerted front through the Association Bretonne,
founded in 1801, whose principal aim was the restoration of pre-Jacobin
political liberties.

The association was soon suppressed by the govern-

ment, but formed again in 1843, only to be banned in 1863.

Attempts to pre$erve the Breton language and distinctive cultural
traditions were also part of the latent nationalism of the nineteenth
century.

Poets and writers were active in the creation of a vernacular

literature in the romantic tradition.

In 1870 a petition to permit the

teaching of Breton in schools was addressed to the government ,but was
turned down.
Among the peasantry there was also a late nirieteenth cent.u ry revival
of interest in the traditional culture, coincident with other changes
triggered by the Second Agricultural Revolution.
channeled into conspicuous consumption.

Increased income was

Highly decorative and costly

costumes of a distinct Breton style appeared, along with carved, ornate
furniture and indigenous architectural styles.

Traditional dances and

music were revived in keeping with the elaboration of festivals and
ceremonies in both social and religious life.
From the various themes of this incipient nationalism--more a collective sentiment than a movement--the URB created an ideology that wove
together the myth of a past cultural order with its sense of ethnic
distinction, and a program of economic and political reform.

It called

for the teaching of Breton in the school system, a recognition of former
Breton rights by an increase in regional representation at the parliamentary level, greater attention to the development of untapped economic
resources, and the alleviation of the economic crisis in ports and towns.
Although ineffective against the intransigent central government, the URB
was instrumental in establishing a model for future nationalist associations.

From this point on, the goal of establishing a new economic order

was inseparable from the recreation of the past-.. . the golden age of poli.,..
tical freedom and cultural and linguistic autonomy.
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The Proliferation of Nationalist Organizations Prior to World War I
In the period of economic crisis prior to the First World War the
nationalist movement expanded rapidly with a proliferation of associations and the appearance of a number of periodicals attempting to foster
a distinctive "Breton consciousness."

A Catholic association founded in

1905 by a liberal priest, Abbe Perrot, was dedicated to the revival of
the language and traditional culture, symbolically taking for its name
the Breton term Bleun-Brug (Heath Flower).

Although professing not to

be concerned with political goals , Abbe Perrot took a firm regionalist
position with respect to

~

restoration of former rights as the only means

of pressuring for economic and social reform.

Bleun-Brug was particular-

ly effective in supporting and accelerating the revival of traditional
Breton music, songs, dances and costumes, organizing regional festivals,
and sponsoring language classes for young people.

At the same time, the

intellectual elite at the forefront of the movement were attempting to
reach all segments of the public through periodicals, newspapers and
reviews.

Over a dozen periodicals, some exclusively in Breton, appeared

during the pre-war era, a few polemical in nature but all dedicated to
reviving a sense of ethnicity along with the need for coupling economic
reform with political and cultural freedom.

To all nationalists, the

Breton language became the symbol of the new ideology. Petitions to permit the teaching of the language were sent yearly to Paris between
1905-1911, but were greeted by silence.
The movement entered a separatist phase in 1911 with the establishment of the first Breton nationalist party (Strollad Broadel Breiz).

8,

Two agpectg differentiated the organization from the URB.

The new

party was led by a small group of young liberal writers and journalists who espoused political activism in contrast, to the URB's conservative and pacifist program.

Furthermore, the basic tenet of the

party p lat fo rm was the complete severance of ties with France and the
creation of a sovereign nation.

It was a stride beyond the URB's

cautious plea for a restoration of regional rights.

To further cir-

culate this demand an official party organ, Breiz Dishual (Free
Brittany), was founded; its rallying cry was "Brittany for the Bretons."
Within its pages appeared one of the strongest denunciations of the
French government yet heard.

Speaking of French "oppression" since

the treaty of 1532, it cited the gradual attrition of liberties, the
loss of language , customs, civil and religious traditions that con'sti tuted the former national patrimony; it spoke of the refusal to
assimilate to French culture' in terms of the ability of "the Breton
soul" to survive and resist all efforts to crush and annihilate it.
Likening Brittany to enslaved Ireland and Poland, the party called for
independence and nationhood, with the use of its own flag, its own
language and national hymns (Barbin 1937:114-115).
Although the militancy of the nationalist party was eclipsed a
few years lat er by the outbreak of the war, the pattern of political
action in the name of nationalism was set as a model to be resurrected
in a new guise at a later date.
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THE DEVELOPMENTAL CAREER OF NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS
The Resurgence of Nationalism and the Rise of Factionalism
While the disruption of four years o.f war brought an end to specific
organizations and the diverse

p~blications

supporting Breton nationalist

goals, some evidence of the movement's viability was revealed at the
Peace Conference in 1919.

Phrasing the aspirations of Breton separatists

in terms of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, a petition was
presented to President Wilson and the conference members calling for
national sovereignty in the name of Brittany's former independence.

The

petition was signed by 800 notables: deputies, senators, general councillors and the five Breton bishops.
The following years saw the inauguration of a series of new periodicals and reviews dedicated to a revival of the nationalist movement.
One journal, Breiz Atao, (Brittany Forever) is considered the most influential (Barbin 1937:127ff).

Like a phoenix rising from the ashes, it

embodied the resurrection of the polemic, the spirit and fervor of the
pre-war publications.

In French and Breton it addressed itself specific-

ally to the leading economic problems of the post-war decade, linking the
only hope for economic development with political independence from France.
Pointing to the recently gained freedom of the Czechs, Bulgars and Poles,
it stated that "the incapacity of the French state machine, the inactivity
of the French people faced with the profound crisis of our epoch, force
us to look to ourselves to find a solution for our economic problems"
quoted in Bolitho 1924:248).

Chief among the issues pinpointed by Breiz

Atao were the increased exodus from the farms, the neglected ports and
urban unemployment.

Calling attention to the disparity between taxes

paid out and government spending for the region, economic salvation was
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viewed in terms o f autonomy: utilization of regional revenues for selfdevelopment; the creation of industry ; rehabilitation of the ports; and
revitalization of a farming econ omy undermined by unfavorable market
conditions.
Through the twenties Breiz Atao remained the principal voice of the
nationalist movement.

Although at first a quarto review, it was later

to become the official organ of a formal party organization.

Support-

ers of the movement held annual congresses to discuss policy and its
implementation; at the Congress held in 1927 the decision to form a
nationalist party was announced. 3

Le Parti Autonomiste Breton (PAB)

was officially founded a few months later.
Internal dissension soon arose over the issue of separatism and
nationho od versus federalism.
was gaining

aili~erents

The concept of a European federation

among bther national minority groups.

Some

Breton nationalists saw distinct advantages to be gained not only in the
structure of federation but in allying the new party with similar political organizations representing minority groups in other areas of
Europe.

Eventually those favoring federalism over separation emerged

in control of the new party, with Breiz Atao the official party journal.

Factionalism continued, however, and combined with financial dif-

ficulties effectively undermined party organization.

In 1931 the

separatists regained leadership of the movement refor,mingin the name
of a new party, the Parti National Breton (PNB).
Although its goals were designed to be realized through legitimate
political channels, neither the PAB nor the PNB fained enough popular
support to carry through a successful electoral campaign.
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Schism wi thin

the ranks of the nationalist leaders, even after the emergence of the
PNB, continued to weaken the effectiveness of the nationalist movement
as a totality.
The need to awaken the public of Brittany, and France as well, to
the urgency of the Breton problem set the course of the PNB through
the Great Depression of the thirties.

The party launched a vigorous

propaganda campaign through Breiz Atao, combined with non-violent demonstrations at government-sponsored ceremonies and on occasions of visits
by French government officials.
Coincident with the emergence of PNB's program of a "politics of
force" was the opening phase of a new "politics of violence."

Modeled

after the Irish Sinn Fein, a secret association formed calling itself
Gwenn Ha Du (White and Black) after the colors of the Breton flag.
Echoing the PNB's program of achieving economic, cultural and linguistic
reforms through independence, it began a series of violent demonstrations against the central government.

One of the initial acts, in

1932, was the blowing up of a statue in Rennes commemorating the union
of Brittany with France at the very moment the French Premier was
attending the celebration of the 400th anniversary of that union in
another Breton city.

Dur.ing the next few years there were numerous

acts of terrorism such as the bombing of administrative buildings in
various towns and cities of the region.

Less militant separatists,

although overtly disavowing the Gwenn Ha Du, realized its value.

One

writer, while admitting it was a terrorist organization, claimed it
had nevertheless struck a forceful blow for the cause and had served
to whip up the energies of the otherwise apathetic Breton (Barbin
1937:141-145).
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The demonstrations also had the effect of reinforcing the .French
government's negative attitude toward the Breton nationalist movement
and its demands, at the same time alerting Paris to the need for a confrontatio:n with the activists.
While the separatists remained divided over the degree of extremism
necessary to achieve their goals, there was implicit agreement that political action had to be taken outside of legitimate channels.

Opposed to

this new point were the regionalists whose pacifism, conservatism and
belief in moderate legitimate courses of action branded them as the reactionaries of the movement.

Some of these associations were among the

pioneers of the movement; the Catholic Breun-Blug, the URB, Association
Bretonne; others like the Gorsedd of Bards although supporting Breton
claims had been essentially apolitical.

4 In 1936 these associations

combined in a Front Breton to formulate a program for political, economic and cultural reforms under a regional scheme.

Forty-one candidates

at the general elections agreed to accept the program and fifteen were
elected.
While .the regionalist view achieved some temporary political representation these successes were not followed by any action on the part
of the government to meet even moderate demands.

In response, the

separatists accelerated their anti-government propaganda and demonstrations.

Finally, in 1939 the government officially dissolved the PNB and

banned its newspaper.

Two of its leaders who had escaped to Germany

were condemned to death in absentia; others were imprisoned.
The exiled leaders in Germany appealed to that government to support
their
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demand for independence, and apparently were assured by high

officials that a Breton state would be set up at the end of the war
(Ellis 1968:188).
After the invasion of France and its subsequent defeat in 1940)
Breton nationalists looked to the German conquerors for support.

The

separatist faction reemerged--from exile and prison--and a new organization Cortseil National Breton was formed to implement the program leading to eventual autonomy.

The Parti National Breton was resurrected and

the official party newspaper given a symbolic title L'heure bretonne.
But their demands for complete autonomy and their violent anti-Vichy
stand brought about several adverse reactions.

The Vichy government

pressured the German administration to take active measures against the
Breton nationalists.

Although no repressive action was taken, German

support of extremist nationalist goals weakened and a shift was made instead to the more moderate demands of the regionalists.

Accordingly, in

1941, the Breton language and history were admitted as subjects within
the schools, radio broadcasts in Breton were authorized, and a Celtic institute was set up to coordinate the cultural societies dedicated to
research on the Breton intellectual and artistic heritage.

The region-

alists were also instrumental in setting up a Comite Consultatif de
Bretagne which was modeled after the pre-revolutionary Parlement de Bretagne,
but failed ito obtain an official status.
The concessions granted to the regionalists, while minimal, served
to antagonize the French and widen the breach between the Bretons and
French, eventually leading to open conflict.

The Vichy government regard-

ed the new-found gains as evidence of an anti-French secessionist plot.
Some members of the maquis, the French resistance movement, apparently
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linking nationalist gains with pro-German

collaborators~ began~

in

1943, a campaign of assassination against Bretons who belonged to any
nationalist group, whether political or cultural in emphasis.
The climax of the anti-Breton campaign came with the

urder of

the founder of Bleun-Brug, Abbe Perrot, the pioneer and symbol of the
nationalist movement.

The effect was to shift many "neutral" Bretons

into open opposition to the French Resistance.

A radical splinter

group from the PNB organized a military unit, the Formation Jean-Marie
Perrot, to oppose the maquis, and aligning themselves with the Germans
accepted German arms and uniforms.

For the remainder of the war the

internecine conflict continued, a symbolic demonstration of the widening gap that separated Breton goals and French determination to oppose
them.
The French view that the Perrot unit typified Breton pro-German and
anti-French activities led directly, in the post war period, to the
severe suppression of all aspects of nationalism.

After the Liberation

the concessions allowed by the Germans were withdrawn and the language
banned; arrest warrants were issued for anyone connected with any Breton
society or association , irrespective of political orientation.

Sentences

of banishment, confiscation of property and loss of civil rights were
passed.

A number of Bretons were imprisoned; some leaders escaped to

Ireland, fifteen were executed in 1946.
The result of this punitive action was to strengthen the base of
the movement rather than weaken it.

From this base a fresh growth of

nationalist associations soom emerged expressing at first cultural rather
than political or economic goals.

Brittany's failure to recover from the

post-war economic slump soon directed attention to the need for action,
and economic demands came once more to the fore of nationalist programs.
~ne

Post-War Economic Crisis
The decade following the Liberation was marked by general economic

stagnation in both rural and urban sectors of Brittany.

A war-time

shift from commercial cash-cropping to a base of mixed farming and
self-subsistence had now to be reversed.

But past experience with un-

stable prices tended to produce a conservative reaction--diversified
farming once revived was sustained as a hedge against market fluctuations and rising food prices, even at the risk of income loss and a
lowered standard of living (Morin 1970:52).
towns and cities began again.

The exodus from farm to

Urban areas, however, had suffered wide-

spread, and in some cases, total destruction during the invasion, and
reconstruction was lagging.

An already atrophied industrial sector

was unable to provide necessary employment for the growing population.
In 1947-50 major strikes and demonstrations broke out among shipyard
workers in two of Brittany's major ports, St. Nazaire and Brest.
Beginning in 1948, while other areas of France entered a period
of growth and expansion, regions such as Brittany, particularly the
more isolated western area (Finistere) continued in a state of stagnation and decline.

Between 1954 and 1962 the number of farmers

fell by 25 percent, and that of fishermen by 20 percent.

The scarcity

of jobs caused by population surplus and social mobility intensified
migration: 2,500 young people were leaving Sud-Finistere annually.
The signs of demographic imbalance were evident after 1950, and the
declining ratio of young people in the total population compared unfavorably with the national average (Morin 1970:49ff).
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Thoge who

remained~Ma

new generation of

farmers-~were instrumen~

tal in breaking away from the pattern of mixed farming.

The period

from 1950 to the late ' 60s saw a transformation paralleling the Second
Agricultural Revolution of the late nineteenth century, a shift to
commercial specialized crops, but with improved technology.

Just as

the new plow marked a major innovation in the past, the tractor now
became the craze.

Rapid mechanization was stimulated both by the

government's stress on expansion and productivity and the availability
of credit from farm syndicates.

But, as Wright points out , mechaniza-

tion was not always the solution to the peasant problem and often had
uneconomic

conse~uences:

one was a heavy burden of peasant indebtedness

and another was the unprofitable attempt to mechanize too small a farm
(Wright 1964:145).
And, too, the modernization of agriculture was more than a matter
of change in technology.

On the distribution side, the marketing sys-

tem had changed little in fifty years.

An archaic transportation system,

the long distance to the Paris market in combination with competitive
pricing from more favored regions often created a situation of feast or
famine.

The government's slowness to take more than minimal action to

regulate the anarchy of market pricing finally produced a violent reaction from Breton commercial farmers. 5
Beginning with the "artichoke revolution" of 1960 and continuing
into 1961, farmers began a series of mass demonstrations in market garden areas climaxing in the

jac~uerie

of June, 1961.

6

At that point some

4,000 farmers on tractors, protesting a sharp drop in commodity prices,
jammed the highway leading to the market town of Morlaix.

The leaders

were young syndicalists whose later arrest triggered almost two weeks of
rural insurrection.
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The Response: the Renascence of the Nationalist Movement
The worsening economic crisis again brought to the forefront the
latent forces of the nationalist movement.

Fragmented groups, their

organizat ions officially dissolved in the post-war reprisals, began to
draw together after 1950 under the unofficial designation of Comite
d'Etudes et de Liaison des Interets Breton (CELIB).1

Its principal

goal was to facilitate regional economic development and expansion
through merging various economic, occupational and cultural groups in
a united front, a r egional pressure group which would draw up and present programs of economic reform to the government .

Although its aims

were primarily economic, the structure of CELIB included a cultural
comndssion concerned with winning official recognition.
Avowedly apolitical, it was nevertheless a reformation of pre-war
conservative regionalist groups, and as such was opposed by the more
politically active separatists, who viewed the solution of economic
problems as possible only wi thin the context of political action and
cultural autonomy.

A schism also deve loped within the CELIB between

those who wished to remain politically neutral and those who favored
seeking left-wing support.
Despite its official recognition as an advisory group by the
government in 1961, some eight years later it had still been unable to
achieve any of its goals in Parliament.

As the failure of the CELIB

became evident the initial reservation of anti-regionalist critics
seemed justified.

Counter-moves to create altern ative programs brought

a proliferation of nationalist associations , which while sharing common
goals, differed in emphasis and means of achievement.

Two types emerged,
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in most cases reflecting continuity with patterns or in some cases
actual organizations established in the pre-war period: those with
a strong politico-economic bias and the cultural organizations that
stressed language reform and the revival of Breton dance, music and
the arts.

Those inclined to political action included, in the order

of their founding:

Le Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne

(MOB), Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB) , Front pour la Liberation
de Bretagne (FLB) , Sav Breizh.

An early opponent of the CELIB policy of qualified regionalism,
the MOB was founded in 1951 in the tradition of the pre-war federalists.

Its program outlined the evolution of Brittany toward internal

federalism within the French state.

But because of de Gaulle's in-

transigence it later shifted its line in favor of independence from
France and incorporation within a European federal state (Ellis 1968:
192).

Led by a militant intellectual, Yann Fouere, a platform of

political, economic and cultural demands was announced with the
familiar emotional overtones of pre-war appeals: "The spirit of the
Breton political movement is decapitated--we must give it a head, a
spirit, a goal, a flame, a hope, a will."

The appeal to young mili-

tants was a strong one, and it is chiefly this group that has responded.

Caerleon, historian of the nationalist movement, states that the

MOB became categorized in time as extremist and has failed to capture
wide-spread popular support (1969:50ff).
To represent the more conservative element, the UDB was formed
in 1963, calling for a special regional assembly with effective autonomy in economic and cultural affairs.
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Though regionalist in aims,

it distinguished itself from CELIB by its emphasis on direct political
action through the polls.
The FLB was the extremist reaction to the failure of legitimate
channels of protest.

Mode ling itself on the pre-war terrorist Gwenn

Ha Du, it began in 1966 to conduct a campaign of violence and for the
next two years set off explosions in police stations and prefectures
and other administrative buildings symbolic of centralized authority.
Since 1969, after a number of arrests, the FLB has suspended its activities.

The ideology of the FLB reflected sophisticated awareness of

the ideological currents of the time.

With reference to Algeria, key

slogans compared the "colonial status" of Brittany and spoke of the need
to "decolonize" the region (Caerleon 1969:141).

As in the case of the

Gwenn Ha Du, the FLB and its activities were officially disclaimed by
other nationalist groups but a statement by the politician and writer
Rene Pleven makes a telling point: "The publi c powers can stop attempts
of the agitators most efficiently by announcing a plan of sweeping
action.

Obvious economic difficulties of the region aid the agitators

to find cooperation in the population" (quoted in Caerleon 1969 :171).
The most recent group to form, the Sav Breizh, is a youth movement
generated by the events of the nation-wide so-called "cultural revolution"
of May-June, 1968.

During the fighting in the Paris streets, young Bretons

carried their Black and White flag along with representatives of other
French minority groups, the Occitans (of Languedoc) and Corsicans, among
others.

The Breton program, socialist in leaning, consisted of a blend

of tradition and innovation; they demanded self-government for the Bretons
with the aim of alleviating underdevelopment, protecting the traditional
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culture and restoring the language.

Their points included opposition

to the common market, a moratorium on farmers' and workers' debts, agricultural cooperatives, and an affirmation of solidarity with all other
oppre ssed minority groups, including the Blacks in North America and the
Indians in South America (Caerleon 1969 : 204ff) .
The post-war revival of the cultural movement is marked by an emphas is on youth organizations as the new vehicles to carry Breton nationalist ic ideals.

In addition to the reestablishment in 1948 of Bleun-

Brug, which, as in the past addressed it s program of cultural revival

8

to Catholic youth , a number of local folklorigue societies were founded,
the Cerc les Celtiques.

These were concerned with traditional Breton

history, folklore, dance and music.

In 1950 a grand confederation of

these and similar organizations was founded under the name of Kendalc'h
At first Kendalc'h

along with other cultural societies, was apolitical,

although implicitly backing nationalist political and economic goals.
However, an eventual decision was made to make an open avowal of political support.

Along with the Association de Sonneurs (association of

Breton musicians) the decision was made to abandon a policy limited to
cultural revival and "engage in combat for Brittany with all our force"
(Caerleon 1969:224).
Today the nationalist movement is decentralized and acephalous.
Factionalism exists, based primarily on the question of what strategies
to employ and what goals have priority.

Yet according to a leader of

the MOB, there is a concensus among the various sectors of the movement--economic, political and cultural--as to the goals themselves,
strongly reinforced by a sense of unity based on a distinctive ethnic
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and linguistic tradition and a well-defined territory (Mainwaring 1969).
In opposition to what is viewed as the common enemy, the government of
France, Breton nationalists have sought support from, and in turn have
supported, other French minority groups: Alsatians, Basques, and the
Occitans of Languedoc (Caerleon 1969:62).

P~~-Celtic

links are firmly

forged, and both cultural and political ties are maintained, particularly
wi th Wales whose own separatists openly back the Breton quest for independence.
In 1969 separatist leaders in Brittany entertained a growing expectation that ,the government would make some real concessions to Breton
demands.

Alan AI Louarn, representing the MOB, in an interview speaks

of preparing for a Breton state; of a shadow cabinet which covers all
administrative structures and is ready to take over responsibility for
the Breton community when the moment arrives (Mainwaring 1969:230).
Until that moment, as Caerleon has put it, Brittany is a country in
"a permanent state of revolution" (Caerleon 1969).
CONCLUSIONS
I have attempted to outline in this case history the various phases
in the development of the Breton nationalist movement with the aim of
generating hypotheses or tentative generalizations useful for a comparative study of nationalism among other minority groups.

The first step

was to establish the basic causes which catalyzed the movement and kept
it viable.

The second was to examine the characteristic forms of ideo-

logy and organizational patterns of the various sectors of the movement.
The third was to trace the development and internal changes in the
movement through the present day.
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With respect to causality, a fundamental distinction must be made
between two types of nationalism; between that which existed wi thin the
major span of the nineteenth century, and that altered form which arose
around the turn of the century .

The distinction corresponds to what has

been called "antiQuarian " nationalism versus "modern" nationalism
(Symmons-Symonolewicz 1 970) .

The former, appearing in the early nine-

teenth century,was a response to the loss of Breton political and cultural liberties at the time of the formation of the Jacobian state.

In

nature it was a passive reaction restricted in social scope to the
aristocracy whose power had been stripped and whose social order was
threatened by republicanism, and to the literati who sought in the
romantic tradition to revive and preserve a mythic past.
Modern Breton nationalism appears to have emerged as a response to
the dislocations caused by rapid economic and social change.

Brittany's

late entry into the world market system forced a rapid development in
the rural and maritime economy.

An improved transport system linked a

peripheral region with metropolitan markets, and commercialization and
specialization in agriculture and fishing followed.

Exposure to the

anarchy of the market soon affected farmer and fisherman alike.

Con-

tracting markets combined with an expanding population brought on an
economic crisis that continued until the beginning of World War I.
As Wolf (1969 :282) has noted, "paradoxically, the very spread of
the capitalist market principle also forced men to seek defenses
against it.

They could meet this end either by cleaving to their trad-

itional institutions, increasingly subverted by the forces which they
were trying to neutralize; or they could commit themselves to the
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search for new social forms which would grant them shelter"

Breton

nationalist organizations erected their defenses by attempting both-to search for new forms, but in the name of the traditional past.

Ideo-

logical platforms varied in the stress placed on the past or future.
Based on these criteria of ideology, two types of nationalist organizations emerged: a "cultural" type seeking reform in terms of the
past ,and a "political " type primarily future-oriented.

Cultural organ-

izations like the Catholic Bleun-Brug viewed social and economic reform
in terms of a return to a former golden age--andthe revival of the
status quo with its fixed social order of nobility, clergy and peasant.
Accordingly, ethnic and linguistic insularity were strongly emphasized.
Leadership was passive, conservative and to the right of regional and
national politics.

Political organizations stressed economic reform in

terms ·of increased development of regional resources--essentially a program of modernization but to be achieved through a return.to the political
autonorrw of the past.

The ins istence on language revival provides the

unifying symbol of continuity linking past and future.
The dynamics of development and change in nationalist organizations
shows certain parallels with the process of revitalization as analyzed by
Wallace (1970:191ff).

With some modifications because of the secular

nature of nationalism, Wallace's stages can be used as a model for understanding the phenomenon of Breton nationalism.
Stage 1: " formulation of a code."

This stage is characteri zed by a

reaction to cultural distortion in which the existing cult ure is
contrasted with the goal culture (past or future).

A program of

demands is set forth and a small group of leaders form the nucleus
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of an organization.

The program may take on the attributes of an

incipient association or political party, but a formal organization
or administrative structure is merely blue-printed.
Stage 2: "communication."

Breton nationalist associations are in-

volved in two kinds of communication: petition and appeal to the
central government, and the dissemination of the code in order to
attract local support.

Frequently, messages are aimed at special

interest groups such as workers, peasants, youth, and Catholics.
The media most frequently used are periodicals.
Stage 3: "organization."

The gradual expansion in the number of

followers and the development of a formal administrative structure
probably takes place at this stage.

The holding of annual party

congresses implies both followers and a formal structure.

A

number of parallel organizations may be present differing in code
and appeal to various groups and components, the basic distinction
being between organizations that stress political goals and those
that emphasize cultural revitalization.
Stage 4: "adaptation."

At this stage there occur reformulations

in code and strategy shifts in leadership.

In any given organiza-

tion factionalism develops over code strategy and leadership
issues which may result in open breaks and even lead to the dissolution of the organization or its fission into a number of different bodies.

In the Breton case, this stage is reached when

economic stress is heightened and demands and petitions are consistently rejected by the central government.
and goals must be formulated.
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Alternative methods

It is under these circumstances

that terrorist splinter groups emerge offering drastic solutions
to the impass e .

If demands are met, even in part, some form of

cultural transformation (Stage 5) may take place.
Stage 5: "cultural trans formation. "

In the case of the nationalism

of minority groups , this stage typically involves government reaction
in the form of severe repressive measures which can lead to a
porary morat orium on nationalist activities.
the pattern before and after World War II.

tem~

In Brittany this was
But whether a true trans-

formation takes place, or a halt is called on overt activism, the
cycle is ended until economic and social dislocations create the
appropriate conditions under which old codes are rephrased, and new
ideologies emerge.

It is with reference to this continuity and the

reshaping of f ami liar patterns within a repetitive cycle, that the
term "permanent revolution" is so pertinent.
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NOTES

1

The case history presented here is developed from secondary mater-

ials which are often openly partisan.

This obviously raises questions of

bias, but materials of this kind reveal nationalist ideas and forms of
behavior which are not likely to be recorded in more "neutral" sources.
One should also keep in mind, though, that nationalist literature is apt
to be heavily weighted in favor of the more dramatic aspects and events
of the movement, and that consequently certain lacunae may be present in
the current study.

Essentially, this paper is an attempt to assemble as

much data on the Breton nationalism as is available in published sources
in the hope that tentative generalizations or hypotheses may arise for
further testing.

It is my intention to follow up this initial research

with a program of field study in Brittany during the summers of 1971
and 1972.
2 While socio-economic reform was the major motivating force behind
the syndicalist movement, there was more than a hint of less high-minded
motivations.

Wright (1964:18-20) suggests that large landlords with

right-wing affiliations sought to enlist peasant support and thus preserve
a sizeable bloc of voters against the inroads of republican ideology.

3 The congress convened at Rosporden, July 1927.

4

The Gorsedd of Bards, organized in 1901 as a society of Breton

poets dedicated to the preservation of Celtic literary traditions, was
modeled after the Gorsedd of CYMRU (Wales) (Ellis 1968:187).
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5 For a detailed discussion of government and legislation dealing
with agrarian reform see Wright (1964:162ff).
6 The "artichoke revolution" was a protest against excessive whole":"
sale prices charged by middlemen.
the power of organizational action.

It had the effect of demonstrating
In May, 1961, farmers of south

Brittany in the region of commercial potato growing protested low prices
by dumping potatoes in town squares and burning ballot boxes to disrupt
elections (Mallet 1962:8, 196; Caerleon 1969:74-76).
7 For detailed discussion of the CELIB see Hayward (1969).
8

Bleun-Brug pledged itself to fight for "the restoration of Christian

Brittany with its cultural, artistic, folkloric and spiritual riches,
under the banner of the Celtic crosslY (Caerleon 1969 :23ff).

Congresses,

language courses, scholastic and choral competitions were part of the
total program to keep the Breton youth aware of their heritage.
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